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Joy of giving and dynastic altruism are considered as two motives for bequests. 
This paper studies a lifecycle model with lifetime uncertainty under these two 
motives. We find that accidental bequests and planned bequests are equal 
under both motives, which allows us to track down family decisions across 
generations that are independent of the mortality history in the family. 
However, the allocations of bequests, annuity savings, non-annuity savings 
and consumptions are different between models with either of the two motives. 
Under the dynastic altruism model, bequests are compensatory and transfers 
from children to parents are also possible. More importantly, rising longevity 
has no impact on capital accumulation per capita in the dynastic model unlike 
a positive effect on capital accumulation in the joy-of-giving model. These 
results with dynastic altruism are consistent with some existing empirical 
results, supporting the validity of the dynastic model.  
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Capital accumulation has been at the center of studies of economic growth for 
decades, since the advent of the neoclassical growth model in the 1950s. 
However, it remains a challenging subject once considering such important 
factors as uncertain survival to old age, intergenerational transfers, life-cycle 
savings and the forms of assets carried to old age or to children. It involves 
controversies about how rising life expectancy affects capital accumulation 
and growth, about why private annuity purchases are very small despite higher 
annuity returns, about what motivates bequests and so on. The different results 
emerge typically from the primitive assumptions about the availability of 
annuity markets and the presence and the form of altruism motivating bequests. 
There are generally three kinds of bequest motives in the literature: joy of 
giving, exchange for better behavior, and dynastic altruism.   
A pioneering paper by Yaari (1965) has aroused enormous interest in a 
variety of topics related with the annuity puzzle in a life-cycle model with or 
without bequests motivated by joy-of-giving. Without bequests, all savings are 
only made for later life by purchasing annuities that have greater returns than 
the market interest rate. This complete annuitization result contradicts the fact 
that most elderly US individuals maintain a flat age-wealth profile rather than 
buy individual life annuities as documented in Friedman and Warshawsky 
(1990). It is also inconsistent with the fact that bequests account for a 
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significant portion of capital in the United States as found in Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981). With a joy-of-giving bequest motive in Yaari (1965), 
however, part of savings is held in bequeathable, non-annuity forms. One 
additional implication of the joy-of-giving motive is that the amount of 
bequests should be equal to all children in a family. Moreover, rising life 
expectancy raises the annuity portion for old-age consumption but reduces the 
non-annuity portion for bequests; overall, rising life expectancy tends to 
increase the total saving. The Yaari model has been extended to incorporate 
neoclassical production in Abel (1986) among others. In the extended models, 
rising longevity increases aggregate saving and hence promotes capital 
accumulation and growth.  
Different from the Yaari model, some papers assume the absence of 
annuity markets; see Abel (1985) and Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2003). Without 
annuity markets, life-cycle savings by those who fail to survive into old age 
become accidental bequests that are equally shared by all surviving children in 
the family. The amount of bequests to a child in this case is dependent on 
family mortality histories; it is increasing with the number of consecutive 
preceding generations in their families who died before consuming their 
savings. As in models with annuity markets, rising life expectancy raises 
aggregate savings and thus promotes capital accumulation as shown in Zhang 
et al. (2003).      
However, at least two of the implications of the models with accidental 
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bequests or with bequests derived from joy-of-giving are not well supported 
by available empirical evidence. First, the implied equal bequest among 
siblings is inconsistent with the negative relationship between bequests to 
children and their earnings within families as found by Light and Kathleen 
(2004). Second, the empirical evidence on the effect of rising life expectancy 
on savings and growth is mixed. Some empirical studies claim a positive 
effect of life expectancy on savings and growth; see Zhang and Zhang (2005), 
whose use of the investment/GDP ratio as a proxy for the saving rate is 
questionable in open economies. In contrast to the findings mentioned above, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) claim little effect of life expectancy on GDP 
and a negative effect of rising life expectancy on GDP per capita due to 
population aging.  
In this paper, we study how individuals allocate income to consumption, 
annuity savings, non-annuity savings and bequests in two versions of a 
two-period life cycle model with the joy-of-giving motive and the dynastic 
altruism motive respectively. Comparisons can be easily observed in the key 
implications of the two versions. In the joy-of-giving model, agents derive 
utility from the size of bequests to children and from their own consumption. 
In the dynastic altruism model, agents derive utility from their own 
consumption and from children’s welfare. Previously, we did not consider the 
altruism model until we found a similar paper by Abel (1986). In Abel (1986) 
with a joy-of-giving bequest motive, agents derive utility from the size of 
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bequests. It argues that accidental bequests (when parents die young) and 
planned bequests (when parents survive to old age) are equal to each other. We 
also obtained the same result from the joy-of-giving model before knowing the 
work of Abel (1986). Compared with the joy-of-giving model, we will show 
how the dynastic model (with altruism toward the welfare of children) 
generates different results that are more consistent with the aforementioned 
empirical evidence.  
Unlike the joy-of-giving model that assumes a known function via which 
utility depends on bequests, the function linking utility to bequests is unknown 
and thus has to be found in the dynastic model.1 One implication of the 
dynastic model is that bequests are inversely related to children’s wage as 
shown in Tomes (1981) both theoretically and empirically. This implication is 
also in line with the empirical evidence in Light and Kathleen (2004). The 
most important result that we obtain from comparing these two models is the 
impact of life expectancy on capital accumulation and economic growth. In 
the joy-of-giving model, there is a positive effect of rising life expectancy on 
capital accumulation and economic growth. However, in the dynastic altruism 
model, rising life expectancy has no effect on aggregate capital accumulation 
and aggregate output, thereby leading to a negative effect of life expectancy on 
per capita output due to population aging. By comparing the different 







is clear that the implication from the dynastic altruism model is more 
empirically plausible than that from the joy-of-giving model. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In section two, we review the 
previous literature. Section three has two parts. In the first part, we derive 
results in the joy-of-giving model with uncertain survival. In part two, we 
derive results from the dynastic altruism model. Section four concludes the 
paper. 
2. Literature review 
We now provide more details about the related literatures concerning uncertain 
lifetime, the various bequest motives and the annuity puzzle. 
2.1 Uncertain lifetime 
The effects of uncertain lifetimes on individuals' savings decisions were first 
examined formally in the paper by Yaari (1965) with or without annuity 
markets. It considers a Fisher-type utility function and a Marshall utility 
function respectively. The former is the typical life-cycle saving model in 
which agents derive utility only from their own lifetime consumption. The 
latter is an extension of the former to the inclusion of separable utility derived 
from the amount of bequests to children. It studies four cases differentiated by 
the availability of bequests and annuity insurance. First, with no bequest 
motivation and no annuity market, survival uncertainty causes consumers to 
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discount the future more heavily. Second, with no bequest motivation but with 
annuity markets available, the consumer is better off by holding annuity as the 
only form of savings, because under the survival uncertainty the annuity 
market gives higher return than non-annuity savings. Third, with bequest 
motivation but with no annuity market, the effect of uncertainty on consumers' 
degree of impatience depends on the difference between the marginal utility of 
consumption and that of bequests. Last but not least, with both bequest 
motivation and annuity markets available, the optimal saving plan is to use 
annuity savings to meet the need of future consumption and use conventional, 
non-annuitized savings for bequests to children. Yaari's model provides a 
fundamental theory for the subsequent studies of consumer savings when 
consumers are faced with uncertain lifetimes.  
Elaborating the case with no bequest motive and no annuity market, Abel 
(1985) attempted to characterize the distribution and evolution of accidental 
bequests. Absent the annuity market, life-cycle savings become accidental 
bequests when consumers die young. Accidental bequests have been shown in 
Abel (1985) to play an important role in “causing the intergenerational wealth 
transfers as well as in the intra-generational wealth variation". More 
specifically, accidental bequests are a function of the family mortality history: 
those who have more consecutive preceding generations died young will 
receive more such bequests, while children in the same family receive equal 
bequests. The mortality history dependence makes it extremely difficult to 
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analyze the distribution and evolution of capital across families and overtime. 
But the implication of equal bequests for all siblings is inconsistent with 
empirical evidence, as we pointed out earlier. The extension of the model of 
Abel (1985) to consider physical and human capital accumulation in Zhang et 
al. (2003) predicts a positive effect of rising life expectancy on physical 
capital accumulation and on economic growth, which is also inconsistent with 
the recent empirical evidence in Acemoglus and Johnson (2007).     
Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) introduced actuarially fair annuities 
sponsored by the government together with a pay-as-you-go social security 
system into an over-lapping generation model populated by fully selfish agents 
without a bequest motive. The amount of bequests is assumed to be equal to 
the unannuitized savings plus interest left by those parents who die at the onset 
of old age. It argues that complete annuitization of consumers' wealth is not 
dynamically optimal, and it recommends that the government should move the 
economy from the current pay-as-you-go social security system to a 
government sponsored, actuarially fair social security. Thus the government 
has to restrict the availability of actuarially fair annuity contracts by either 
setting a maximum purchasing limit or requiring a minimum mandatory 
amount of annuity. Their justification for government intervention hinges on 
their assumption of the existence of a positive externality of aggregate capital 
in final production. 
 8 
 
2.2 Bequest motives 
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) empirically studied the role of bequests in 
aggregate saving. They applied historical U.S. data to estimate the 
contribution of intergenerational transfers to capital accumulation and reported 
the evidence that bequests account for as much as four fifths of U.S. capital 
stock while life cycle savings accounts “only a negligible fraction”. They 
show that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is inadequate in 
explaining the saving behavior in the United States.  
Kuehlwein (1993) used the Retirement History Survey and examined a 
parameterized life-cycle model with uncertainty and bequest motivation. The 
estimated bequest parameters for households with and without children are 
both significant and close to each other. This means that households value 
bequests as much as their own consumption. Such a strong bequest motive can 
be seen to mute the effects of lifetime uncertainty on consumption growth, 
casting doubt on models without a bequest motive. 
There are different schools of thoughts on why individuals want to leave 
bequests to their offspring. One of them is called the joy of giving. That is, 
utility derived from bequests is only dependent on the size of the bequests via 
an assumed function. Abel (1986) uses it in an overlapping-generations model 
with an actuarially fair social security. One result that coincides with one of 
our results is that the accidental bequests and planned bequests are equal. We 
obtained this result before knowing Abel's work. However, this model with 
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joy-of-giving predicts a positive effect of rising life expectancy on aggregate 
savings and GDP and implies equal bequests to all siblings, both of which are 
inconsistent with recent empirical evidence. We will therefore focus on a 
different model and attempt to obtain different results that can better explain 
empirical evidence. 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) also introduced a joy-of-giving bequest 
motive into an overlapping-generation model with uncertain lifetime and with 
two kinds of social security. The two social security programs are a 
fully-funded system and a pay-as-you-go system, respectively. They show that 
these two social security systems are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates 
and have the same optimal level. They also propose a well-know 
“segmentation”: at the optimum level, private savings provide bequests to next 
generation, while social security with annuity benefits is used solely to sustain 
future consumption in old age.  
Bernheim et al. (1985) proposed a model with “strategic” bequests. In 
their theoretical formulation, individuals, though altruistic, are considered to 
have bequeathable wealth intentionally to manipulate their offspring’s 
behavior. They present empirical support for a scenario that attention from 
children is positively correlated with bequeathable wealth. An essential 
assumption for the strategic behavior is that the number of children exceeds 
one. Our model with unisex and with just one child per parent bypasses such a 
strategic consideration.  
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Tomes (1981) assumed that all bequests are intentional and motivated by 
dynastic altruism. It used empirical tests and strongly confirmed that bequests 
to children were negatively related to their earnings. That is, bequests were 
compensatory according the data, which means that children within a family 
or from the families with the same income level inherited more bequests if 
they have lower earnings. The compensatory effect reduced the variance of 
bequests by 30 percent and reduced the correlation between bequests and 
income to 0.12. His paper does not consider uncertain survival as was 
typically the case in dynastic models, however.  
Toshihiro (1993) added three alternative bequest motives into an 
overlapping-generations model and studied their effects on economic growth. 
Three bequest motives are: the altruistic bequest motive, the 
bequest-as-consumption (joy of giving) motive, and the bequest-as-exchange 
(strategic) motive. In the altruistic bequest model, parents concern their 
children’s wellbeing, so the utility that parents get from giving bequests is 
related with their children’s total utility. In the bequest-as-exchange model, 
parents use bequests as payment for their children’s actions that they wish 
them to undertake such as attention to them when they get old. In the 
bequest-as-consumption model, parents care about their children's bequests 
instead of children's wellbeing. The paper studies the three bequest motives’ 
long-run effects on economic growth. The result shows that the effects of the 
three bequest motives on economic growth are qualitatively the same. 
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However, survival is certain in his model. 
2.3 Annuity puzzle 
“Annuity puzzle” is the contradiction between the theoretical prediction and 
empirical evidence. Theoretically, individuals would choose annuity as the 
sole means against the uncertainty in the form of life expectancy risk since 
annuities yield higher returns than unannuitized savings as shown in Yaari 
(1965). However, empirical evidence indicates that the demand for private 
annuities is very low.  
Bernheim (1991) concluded three different schools of thoughts to explain 
the “annuity puzzle”. The first and most obvious reason is that most people 
save to leave a bequest to their heirs. Without bequest motive, the allocation of 
individuals' wealth simply depends on whether the annuity market’s rate of 
return exceeds the market interest rate. The second explanation is the existence 
of social security and pension plans. The third explanation is that the annuity 
market is not priced fairly. All the transaction costs, monopoly profits and the 
adverse selection problem can discourage people from purchasing annuities. 
Bernheim (1991) presented new empirical evidence that individuals choose 
bequeathable forms of savings over annuity purchasing even if the annuity 
market is perfectly fair. He also argues that social security benefits depress 
annuity holdings and induce buying life insurance instead.  
Inkmann, Lopes and Michaelides (2008) used U.K. microeconomic data 
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to rationalize the observed annuity rates, as well as to empirically analyze the 
determinants of the demand for voluntary annuities. Among their results, a 
strong bequest motive is found out to play an important role in accounting for 
the low accumulation and low annuity demand, as opposed to the opinion of 
Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia (2005). 
3. The model 
In this economy, time is discrete expanding from the initial period to infinity, 
ݐ ൌ 1, 2, 3, … ∞. Agents are unisexual and live for a maximum of two periods 
in lifetime, working in the first period and living in retirement in the second. 
Their survival rate to old age is exogenously given by ݌ א ሺ0,1ሻ. Each young 
agent gives birth to exactly one child. 
Agents are allowed to save either in the form of annuity ܣ  or 
non-annuity ܵ.  In period ݐ , each worker earns a wage income ௧ܹ  and 
receives a bequest ܤ௧
௝ from the last generation. The amount of the received 
bequest equals what the parent gives, denoted as ܤ௧ௌ, if he/she survives to old 
age; otherwise it is denoted as ܤ௧஽ which equals the non-annuity saving plus 
interest: 
 ܤ௧
௝ ൌ ቊ  
  ܤ௧ௌ         if parent survives
ܤ௧஽ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻܵ௧ିଵ otherwise
            (1) 
They divide their resource between period- ݐ  consumption ܥଵ௧ , annuity 
purchasing ܣ௧ and savings ܵ௧. Annuity savings earn a higher rate of return  
a୲ାଵ, conditional on survival to old age, than the market rate ݎ௧ାଵ that applies 
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to non-annuity savings. If they are alive in old age in period ݐ ൅ 1, they 
consume ܥଶ௧ାଵ that depends on the return to different forms of assets they 
purchased in period ݐ, and they leave bequests to their children   ܤ௧ାଵௌ  ; If 
they die accidentally at the end of the first period in life, non-annuity savings 
with returns are given to their offspring as accidental bequests in the second 
period in life. Suppose that the annuity market is a perfectly competitive 
market. Thus, we expect 
  1 ൅ ܽ௧ାଵ ൌ
ଵା௥೟శభ
௣
                  (2) 
The household budget constraint is given as 
 ܥଵ௧ ൌ ܤ௧
௝ ൅ ௧ܹ െ ܣ௧ െ ܵ௧,                   (3)   
 ܥଶ௧ାଵ ൌ ቀ
ଵା௥೟శభ
௣
ቁ ܣ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧ െ  ܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ                (4) 
Two motives for bequests are considered: joy of giving and dynastic 
altruism. With the joy of giving bequest motive, agents derive utility from the 
size of the bequests that they give to their offspring. Bequests are treated like 
consumption.  
With the dynastic altruism bequest motive, agents care about their 
children’s welfare instead of the bequests’ size itself: The utility from giving 
bequests is the discounted welfare of their children. In other words, agents’ 
welfare function comes from the utility from their own consumptions and their 
next generation’ welfare. There is thus a tradeoff between the current 
generation’s consumption and the next generation’s. Agents can choose to 
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either consume or save as bequests for the next generation’s consumption. 2 
3.1 Joy-of-giving model 
Suppose the preference of agents is defined over their own lifecycle 
consumption and the joy of giving bequests to their children: 
 ܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ݌ܸሺܤ௧ௌሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܸሺܤ௧஽ሻ                 (5) 
where ߚ  is discount factor, 0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1. Both ܷሺ·ሻ and  ܸሺ·ሻ are strictly 
increasing and strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions. 
Production is neoclassical ௧ܻ  ൌ ܨሺܭ௧, ܮ௧), where ܭ௧ is the society’s total 
capital, and ܮ௧ is the total labor force, where ܨሺܭ௧, ܮ௧) is increasing, concave 
and homogenous of degree one. It also meets the Inada conditions for interior 
solution. In this model with one unit of inelastic labor supply, the production 
function can be described as ݕ௧ ൌ  ݂ ሺ݇௧ሻ in terms of per worker units. 
Suppose that firms earn zero profit and that all markets are competitive, 
with a 100% depreciation rate. Then, production factors are compensated by 
their marginal products: 1 ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ݂Ԣሺ݇௧ሻ and ௧ܹ ൌ ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ െ ݇௧݂Ԣሺ݇௧ሻ. The 
initial stock of capital ݇଴ is owned by old people.  
 The young agents maximize their lifelong utility, 
max஺,ௌ,஻ ௧ܷ ൌ  ܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ݌ܸሺܤ௧ାଵௌ ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܸሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ሻ 
s.t. ܥଵ௧ ൌ   ܤ௧
௝ ൅ ௧ܹ െ ܣ௧ െ ܵ௧ ,                 (6) 
 ܥଶ௧ାଵ ൌ   ቀ
ଵା௥೟శభ
௣
ቁ ܣ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧ െ   ܤ௧ାଵ







The first-order conditions are derived below: 
 ܣ௧:     ܷԢሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൌ ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܷԢሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ,                 (8) 
   ܤ௧ାଵௌ :    ߚܷԢሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܸԢሺܤ௧ାଵௌ ሻ,                                (9) 
 ܵ௧: ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܸԢሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷ′ሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ. (10) 
Equation (8) is the optimal condition for the annuity purchasing and states that 
the loss of utility for buying one unit annuity in period ݐ is equal to the 
present value of the expected utility in period ݐ ൅ 1 from the returns of the 
one unit bought in period ݐ. Equation (9) is the optimal condition for the 
planned bequest given to the next generation. The present loss of utility from 
saving one unit of consumption for bequests is equal to the increased utility 
from giving bequests. Equation (10) is the optimal condition for non-annuity 
savings. It states that the loss of utility form saving one extra unit of 
consumption is equal to the sum of the expected utility from giving accidental 
bequests if failing to survive or from the consumption in period ݐ ൅ 1 if 
surviving. 
 
Proposition 1: Accidental bequests and planned bequests are equal to each 
other: ܤ௧ାଵௌ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧.  
 
Proof: Equations (8) and (9) imply 
ܷ′ሺܥଵ௧ ሻ ൌ ܸ′ሺܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ሻ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ.                 (11) 
Substituting (9) and (11) into equation (10) yields 
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    ܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵௌ ሻ ൌ ܸ ′ሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ሻ                     (12) 
Since ܸሺ·ሻ is strictly increasing and strictly concave, this gives that 
ܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧                     (13) 
Q.E.D. 
 
This result allows us to assume that agents start with the same amount of 
bequests regardless of whether their parents survive to old age or not, i.e. 
ܤ௧
௝ ൌ ܤ௧஽ ൌ ܤ௧ௌ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ሻܵ௧ିଵ . 
3  Consequently, the decisions are 
independent of the mortality history of a family. This allows us to focus on the 
two periods of generations in dealing with the asset transfers from generation 
to generation under the circumstances that annuity markets exist. This differs 
from Abel (1985)’s result that accidental bequests cause bequests’ intra-cohort 
variation due to the different mortality histories of their families. Moreover, it 
is worth noting that in doing so we do not assume that all assets must be held 
in annuities as opposed to some related literature on the evolution of wealth 
across generations with annuity markets. 
Abel (1986) has proved this result in a different way by deriving utility 
from the size of the bequests. We find that there are similarities between this 
joy-of-giving model and Abel (1986)’s model, although Abel (1986) focused 
on the social security’s influence on capital accumulation. This finding forced 






altruism model for more empirically plausible predictions in the next part. 
  We now assume constant-relative-risk-aversion utility as an important 
example: 
ܷሺܥሻ  ൌ ஼
భష഑ିଵ
ଵିఙ
 and ܸ ሺܾሻ ൌ  ׎ ௕
భష഑ିଵ
ଵିఙ
    0 ൏ ߪ; 0 ൏ ׎ ൏ ߚ ൏ 1 
where ׎ is the paremeter that reflects how people value giving bequests. 
Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia (2005) consider this parameter as increasing 
with age because agents are strategic in order to encourage children to take 
care of them. Since we are studying a joy-of-giving motive which is not 
related with age, we assume ׎ is constant. The restriction 0 ൏ ׎ ൏ ߚ ൏ 1 
means that people value more of their own consumption in their second period 
of life than bequests given to their next generation. 
 
Proposition 2: With a CRRA utility and an exogenous survival rate and 
bequest motive, the ratio of annuity to non-annuity savings is increasing with 
the survival rate but decreasing with the joy of giving bequests to children.  
 
Proof: With the result of proposition 1, we can use the utility function that we 
assumed previously and rewrite equation (12) 








                                     (14) 






ܣ௧                       (15) 







഑                      (16) 
The claims follow. Q.E.D. 
This result shows how people allocate their income between non-annuity 
savings and annuities. Under the condition that ׎ and ߚ are constant, the 
ratio of annuity savings to non-annuity savings are increasing in the survival 
rate ݌. That happens when agents expecting a greater probability of survival 
save less in non-annuity forms and buy more annuities to support their second 
period's consumption. If ݌ and ߚ are constant, the higher the taste for giving 
bequests, the greater the non-annuity savings relative to annuity savings, 
because non-annuity savings are left for bequests. When ߚ, ׎, ݌, and ߪ are 
all exogenously determined, the ratio of annuity savings to non annuity 
savings is constant. There is a balance between annuity purchasing and non 
annuity savings. This helps to explain the annuity puzzle. Agents with a 
bequest motive tend to save a certain portion of their income for the joy of 
giving bequests in case they die young.  
 
Proposition 3: In period ݐ, young people allocate their income depending on 
the survival rate. The amount of annuity savings that they purchase is 
increasing in the survival rate; non-annuity savings and young-age 




Proof: Use the utility function that we assumed previously and rewrite 
equation (8) as below, 
ܥଵ௧ିఙ ൌ ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܥଶ௧ାଵିఙ .                   (17) 







ܣ௧             (18) 








ܣ௧               (19) 
































ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                            (22) 
The claims now become obvious. Q.E.D. 
 
 From equations (20), (21) and (22), obviously ܣ௧ is increasing in the 
survival rate ݌  while ܵ௧  and ܥଵ௧  are decreasing in ݌ . The economic 
implication is as follows. When the survival rate increases, agents would 
concern more about their consumption in the second period of life. They will 
consume less when young and hold more savings for old age. Since the return 
of annuity savings is larger than the return of non-annuity savings, and since 
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the risk of losing annuity savings in the case of death is decreased, they are 
more willing to increase annuity savings rather than non-annuity savings.  
 In a closed economy, the equilibrium condition for the capital market in 
our model is given below. 
    ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܣ௧ ൅ ܵ௧                                     (23) 
Substituting equations (20) and (21) into (23) gives, 












ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                 (24) 
From Proposition 1, we know that 









݇௧               (25) 
From firms’ behavior,  
1 ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻ                                     (26) 
௧ܹ ൌ ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ െ ݇௧݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻ                           (27) 
Substituting (25), (26) and (27) into (24), we get the law of motion of k, 





















݇௧ ൅ ݂ሺ݇௧ሻ െ ݇௧݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻሿ(28) 
This is an implicit function where ݇௧ାଵ is determined by ݇௧. That is, given 
݇଴ , this function will determine the capital stock in every future period 
implicitly. But it cannot provide a reduced form solution for the sequence of 
capital stock explicitly. To this end, we assume logarithmic utility and 
Cobb-Douglas production. Under such conditions, we have ߪ ൌ 1 , 
݂ሺ݇ሻ  ൌ ݇ఈ, 1 ൅ ݎ௧ ൌ ݂ᇱሺ݇௧ሻ ൌ ߙ݇௧
ఈିଵ, and ௧ܹ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ݇௧
ఈ. 
 Equation (28) becomes 
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ఈሿ   





ఈ                                 (29) 
 






Proof: It is easy to find the unique steady state level of capital from (29). Take 
the first derivative of equation (29) and get 
ௗ௞೟శభ
ௗ௞೟




ఈିଵ ൐ 0                               (30) 
which is greater than 1 at the origin with ݇ near zero but less than 1 at the 
steady state ݇כ. Take the second derivative of equation (29) and get 
ௗ௞೟శభ
ௗ௞೟
మ ൌ  ߙ
௣ఉሺଵିఈሻା׎
ଵା׎ା௣ఉ
 ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݇௧
ఈିଶ ൏ 0                    (31) 
Therefore equation (29) is a concave function. Also note that at the origin 
point ݇௧ାଵ is divergent. So ݇௧ାଵ is increasing in ݇௧ at a diminishing rate 
and globally convergent to the unique steady state. Q.E.D. 
 
 From the first derivative in (30), we can get 
      lim௞೟՜଴
ௗ௞೟శభ
ௗ௞೟




Graphically, ݇௧ାଵሺ݇௧ሻ starts above the 45-degree line and then intersects it. 













In Figure 1, ݇כ is the steady state, which is the point where ݇௧ାଵ function 




ሿଵ/ሺଵିఈሻ                                   (32) 
If ݇଴ ൐  ݇כ, then ݇௧ାଵ ൏ ݇௧, thus ݇ଵ ൏ ݇଴, as shown in Figure 1, that is, ݇௧ 
starts to decreasing until it converges to ݇כ and becomes stable. If ݇଴ ൏  ݇כ, 
then ݇௧ାଵ ൐ ݇௧, thus ݇ଵ ൐ ݇଴, as shown in Figure 1, that is, ݇௧ starts to 
increasing until it converges to ݇כ and becomes stable. 
 
Proposition 5: When there is an increase in ׎, ݇௧ାଵሺ݇௧ሻ shift upwards, 
which leads to an increase in the steady state ݇כ. With plausible numerical 







Proof: Take the first derivative of equation (29) in ׎ and get 





ఈ ൐ 0 
Thus ݇௧ାଵ  is increasing in ׎, which means that ݇௧ାଵ  shifts upwards as 
shown in figure 2. As we can see in Figure 2, the steady state ݇כ is also 




















Starting from an initial balanced growth path, when there is an increase in ׎ 
(i.e. with more joy of giving), agents will save more capital as bequests to 
their offspring. Thus, the ݇௧ାଵ curve shifts upwards and the steady state ݇כ 
is increased.  
 Take the first derivative of equation (29) in ݌ and get 






If ׎ ൏ ଵିఈ
ఈ
, ݇௧ାଵ is increasing in ݌. This means that when the survival rate 
increases, the ݇௧ାଵ curve shifts upwards and leads to a higher steady state 
݇௧ାଵ 
݇כ  ݇כԢ  ݇௧  
 24 
 
level of capital if the taste for bequest giving is less than the ratio of the labor 
share to the capital share in output. If ׎ ൐ ଵିఈ
ఈ
, ݇௧ାଵ is decreasing in ݌. This 
means that when survival rate increases, the ݇௧ାଵ curve shifts downwards 
and leads to a lower steady state level of capital. Q.E.D. 
 
 The reason why it is ambiguous about the influence of ݌ on ݇כ is as 
follows: when the survival rate increases, agents concern more about old-age 
consumption and less about bequests to the next generation. From Proposition 
3, agents respond to the increase in the survival rate by increasing annuity 
savings for their own consumption in old age but decreasing non-annuity 
savings for bequests to children. According to Proposition 4, the net change in 
the aggregate saving then depends on whether the taste for bequest giving is 
below or above the ratio of the labor share to the capital share in output. If the 
taste for bequest giving is below (above) the ratio of the labor share to the 
capital share in output, the decline in the non-annuity savings is smaller (larger) 
than the increase in annuity savings, leading to a net increase (decrease) in the 
total saving.  
 In the real world, the labor share exceeds the capital share in output, with 
a standard value of α being equal to 1/3. Also, ׎ is less than ߚ ൏1 under 
the plausible postulation that agents are mainly concerned about their own 
consumption. So ׎ is less than ଵିఈ
ఈ
. Therefore the overall influence of ݌ on 
economic growth is positive. The higher total saving rate can compensate for 
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the increased old-aged population’s consumption and lead to a higher steady 
state capital per worker.  
 There are three limitations of the joy-of-giving model. Firstly, the 
assumption of the bequest motive is only one of several possible motives for 
bequests. From the previous literature, there are generally three ways to 
assume the utility from bequests. One is from the size of the bequests like 
Abel (1986) under the joy of giving motive; one is from the total bequeathable 
assets that agents are holding like Vidal-Melia and Ana Lejarraga-Garcia 
(2005) under the joy of giving motive and strategic motive; the other one is 
from the next generations’ total income like Lambrecht, Michel and Vidal 
(2005) under the dynastic altruism. But there is no direct evidence showing 
which assumption should be selected. Therefore, it is not convincing enough 
that the utility function is only derived from the size of bequests. 
 Second, agents may care children's welfare rather than the bequests only. 
From previous literature, children’s income is also taken into consideration 
when agents make decisions about the size of the bequests they give to their 
children. Light and McGarry (2004) argued that bequests are compensatory: 
The children with lower income tend to get more bequests from their parents. 
This is indirect evidence again the joy-of-giving assumption because it implies 
equal bequests to children regardless of their relative earnings. 
 Third, under the joy of giving bequest motive, the implication that capital 
accumulation is increasing in the survival rate is inconsistent with empirical 
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studies such as Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).  
 To overcome the limitations, we further introduce an altruism model. The 
major difference between the joy-of-giving model and the altruism model is 
the different notions of marginal utility these two models are trying to equalize 
with respect to bequest giving. The joy-of-giving model equalizes the marginal 
utility of one's own consumption with the marginal utility of giving bequests 
to children, whereby children's earnings do not matter. By contrast, the 
altruism model equalizes the marginal utility of one's own consumption with 
the marginal utility of children's consumption symmetrically and recursively, 
whereby children's earnings do matter. 
3.2 Dynastic altruism model 
In this altruism model, a Bellman equation is set up and ܤ௧
௝ is the state 
variable. ܵ௧, ܣ௧ and ܤ௧ାଵௌ  are the control variables. ܸሺܤ ൅ ܹሻ is the total 
welfare of one generation.4 The form of the function is unknown and has to be 
solved. Agents’ welfare includes not only the utilities from two periods’ 
life-cycle consumption but also the discounted expectation value of their next 
generation’s welfare. Agents care their own life-cycle consumption more than 
their children’s. Let ߜ  be the discounted factor on child welfare, with 








Then the problem can be formulated as: 
    ܸ൫ܤ௧
௝ ൅ ௧ܹ൯ ൌ max஺,ௌ,஻ሼܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ߜሾ݌ܸሺܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൅
                                      ሺ1 െ ݌ሻܸሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻሿሽ 
s.t.   ܥଵ௧ ൌ   ܤ௧
௝ ൅ ௧ܹ െ ܣ௧ െ ܵ௧                       (33) 
      ܥଶ௧ାଵ ൌ   ቀ
1൅௥೟శభ
݌
ቁ ܣ௧ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧ െ ܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ             (34) 
The first-order conditions are given below: 
ܤ௧
௝:    ܸᇱ൫ܤ௧
௝ ൅ ௧ܹ൯ ൌ ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ሻ,                              (35) 
ܣ௧:    ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൌ ߚሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܷᇱሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ,             (36) 
 ܤ௧ାଵௌ :   ߚܷᇱሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ߜܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵௌ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ,         (37) 
    ܵ௧:   ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൌ ߜሺ1 െ ݌ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷᇱሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ 
                           ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ.                (38) 
These equations are similar to those of the joy-of-giving model except for 
having one more condition. However, the meaning is different since 
ܸሺܤ ൅ ܹሻ is an unknown welfare function instead of an assumed utility 
function from giving bequests. Equation (35) is the new condition which 
means that an increase in bequests increases utility from consumption which 
can be also reflected in the increased total welfare. Equation (36) is the 
optimal condition for the annuity purchasing and states that the loss of the 
utility for buying one unit annuity in period t is equal to the present value of 
the expected utility in period t+1 from the returns of the one unit bought in 
period t. Equation (37) is the optimal condition for the planned bequest given 
to the next generation. The present loss of the utility from saving one unit 
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instead of consumption for bequests is equal to the increased discounted utility 
from the increased welfare of the next generation. Equation (38) is the optimal 
condition for non-annuity savings. It states that the loss of utility form saving 
one extra unit is equal to the sum of the discounted next generation’s welfare 
and the expected utility from the consumption in period t+1. 
Proposition 6: With a dynastic model, accidental bequests and planned 
bequests are equal to each other: ܤ௧ାଵௌ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧.  
 
Proof: Equations (36) and (37) imply 
ܷ′ሺܥଵ௧ ሻ ൌ ܸ′ ሺܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻߜ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ            (39) 
Then substituting (39) and (37) into equation (38), we can get 
ܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൌ ܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ               (40) 
Since ܸሺ·ሻ is strictly increasing and strictly concave following the primitive 
assumptions of ܷሺ·ሻ in equations (35) and (37), this gives that 
ܤ௧ାଵ
ௌ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ஽ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܵ௧ ൌ ܤ௧ାଵ                         (41) 
Q.E.D. 
 
This result is the same as that in the joy-of-giving model. This means that 
decisions are independent of the mortality history of a family no matter what 
kind of motive of the two that induces parents to give bequests. This 
independence is particularly useful in the dynastic model because otherwise it 
would be extremely difficult to work out the evolution of the state variables. In 
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the dynastic model, the agent’s welfare function becomes 
 ܸሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ max஺,ௌ,஻ሼܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ߜܸሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻሽ 
All the following proofs are based on this result. 
 For simplicity, we assume ߪ ൌ 1. Then, the constant-relative-risk-aversion 
utility from consumption ܷሺܥሻ ൌ ஼
భష഑ିଵ
ଵିఙ
 becomes logarithmic utility 
ܷሺܥሻ ൌ ݈݊ ܥ.  
  
Proposition 7: With log utility and the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
agents allocate their annuity saving, non annuity saving and consumption in 
proportion to their income. Annuity savings are increasing in the survival rate; 
both non annuity savings and young-age consumption are decreasing in the 
survival rate. 
 





                                      (42) 




ቁ ܣ௧                             (43) 
Substitute (43) and constraint (33) into equation (42), 
ሺ1 ൅ ߚ݌ሻܣ௧ ൅ ߚ݌ܵ௧ ൌ ߚ݌ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                       (44) 
From Proposition 6 we know that ܤ௧ௌ ൌ ܤ௧஽,  
Equation (39) can be rewritten as 
ܷ′ሺܥଵ௧ ሻ ൌ ܸ′ሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻߜሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ                 (45) 
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Equation (35) can be rewritten as 
    ܸᇱሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ ሻ 
Forward to ݐ ൅ 1 period, then 
ܸᇱሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൌ ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ାଵ ሻ                             (46) 
Substitute equation (46) into equation (45), 
ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ ሻ ൌ ߜ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ ܷᇱሺܥଵ௧ାଵ ሻ                         (47) 
Under the assumption ܷሺܥሻ ൌ ݈݊ ܥ, equation (47) becomes 
    ܥଵ௧ାଵ ൌ ߜሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻܥଵ௧                               (48) 
 As in the joy-of-giving model, when ߪ ൌ 1, the ratios of annuity savings, 
non annuity savings and young-age consumption to income are all constant. 
Thus we guess for the dynastic altruism model this result applies as well. We 
assume ܣ௧ ൌ ߦ஺ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ , ܵ௧ ൌ ߦௌሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ  and ܥଵ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߦ஺ െ
ߦௌሻሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ. 
 Then equation (44) becomes 
    ሺ1 ൅ ߚ݌ሻߦ஺ ൅ ߚ݌ߦௌ ൌ ߚ݌                           (49) 
And equation (48) becomes 
ሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൌ  ߜ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                     (50) 
Rewrite equation (50) as 




ൌ  ߜ ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                              (51) 
 Under the assumption of the Cobb–Douglas function, 1 ൅ ݎݐ൅1 ൌ ߙ݇ݐ൅1
ߙെ1; 
௧ܹ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݇௧ఈ. 








݇௧ାଵ                           (52) 
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According to general equilibrium, this is the same as in the joy-of-giving 
model, 
    ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ܭ௧ାଵ ൌ ܣ௧ ൅ ܵ௧                                     (53) 
Substitute equation (53) into equation (52), 




ሺܣ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ሻ                               (54) 






ܣ௧ ൌ  ߜ ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                            (55) 
Equation (44) and (55) can be used to solve for both ܵ௧ and ܣ௧ as follows: 
    ܣ௧ ൌ
ఉ௣ሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
    ܵ௧ ൌ
ఈఋሺଵାఉ௣ሻିఉ௣ሺଵିఈሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
The ratios of annuity savings, non annuity savings and the first period’s 
consumption to income are all constant. This result proves our guess is correct 








                                   
ߦ஼ ൌ 1 െ ߦ஺ െ ߦௌ ൌ
ଵିఈఋ
ଵାఈఉ௣
                                  
The allocations of annuity savings, non annuity savings and young-age 












ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                                  (58) 
It is obvious that ܣ௧ is increasing in ݌, and ܥଵ௧ is decreasing in ݌.  
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 Then take the first derivative of ܵ௧, 






Thus ܵ௧ is decreasing in ݌. Q.E.D. 
 
 The implications of these results are intuitive. If the survival rate is 
increased, then agents need to sacrifice more consumption when young for 
consumption when old. Therefore, young-age consumption decreases and 
annuity savings for old-age consumption increase but non-annuity savings for 
bequest giving decrease. These results are still the same as those with the 
joy-of-giving model. But the allocation of annuity savings, non annuity 
savings, and young-age consumption has been changed due to different 
models. We show the different implications below. 
 
Proposition 8: Agents not only care the size of the bequests they give to 
offspring, but also take into consideration of their future income. The size of 
bequests that agents leave is decreasing in their children’s wage. Bequests are 
compensatory.6 
 
Proof:  The claim follows equation (50): 











From the equation, it is obvious that bequests are increasing in agents' own 
income and decreasing in their children’s wage. When agents make decisions 
on how much bequests to give, they will compare their own income with 
children’s earnings. Once their own income overwhelms their children’s 
earnings, they save a portion of their income to support their children. That is, 
bequests are compensatory. This result has solid empirical supports. Papers 
like Tomes (1981) and Light and McGarry (2003) used empirical tests and 
strongly confirmed that children within a family or from the families with the 
same income level inherited more bequests if they have lower earnings. 
Comparing to this model, the joy-of-giving model has neglected an important 
variable that affects agents’ decision on giving bequests.  
 
Proposition 9: The economy converges to a unique steady state ݇כ ൌ 
ሺߙߜሻଵ/ሺଵିఈሻ.  
 




ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                                 (59) 
Rewrite it as 
ܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹ ൌ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
݇௧ାଵ                              (60) 
Substitute equation (60) into equation (50), 
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                ൌ  ߜ ଵାఈఉ௣
ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
݇௧ାଵߙ݇௧ାଵఈିଵ 
                ൌ  ߜ ଵାఈఉ௣
ሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
݇௧ାଵఈ  
Back to period ݐ, we get 
ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ  ߜ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ఋାఉ௣
݇௧ఈ                              (61) 
Substituting equation (61) into equation (59), we can get the capital 
accumulation function 
݇௧ାଵ ൌ  ߙߜ݇௧ఈ                                    (62) 
It is a different capital accumulation function from that in the joy-of-giving 








The economy converges to a steady state. 











Set ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݇௧, we get ݇כ, 
݇כ ൌ ሺߙߜሻଵ/ሺଵିఈሻ                                  (63) 
Q.E.D. 
 
 We can now obtain the key result in the current paper: 
Proposition 10: Since ݇כ is increasing in ߜ, the more agents care about the 
next generation’s welfare, the more capital accumulated. There is no influence 
of the survival rate on capital accumulation. 
 
Proof: The proof follows Proposition 9. Q.E.D. 
 Like the joy-of-giving model, increasing in ߜ  shifts the ݇௧ାଵ  curve 














݇כ  ݇כԢ  ݇௧  
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 The implication is similar to that in the joy-of-giving model as well. Both 
ߜ and Φ represent how much agents care about their next generations. The 
more they care about their children, the more they save and give, which results 
in a higher steady state level of capital. The major difference is that the 
altruism model implies that no matter how much agents care about their 
second period life or how likely they survive to old age, capital accumulation 
remains unaffected. As we discussed in the joy-of-giving model, increasing in 
݌ or ߚ will on the one hand increase annuity savings and on the other hand 
increase old-age consumption by cutting non-annuity savings as bequests. The 
total effect of the survival rate or the taste for old-age consumption on capital 
accumulation is positive for most plausible parameterization. In the dynastic 
altruism model, the capital accumulation function is only related with the 
capital share and the degree of how agents care about the next generation’s 
welfare. The effects of ݌ or ߚ on saving and old-age consumption mutually 
offset each other. The capital we are discussing about is the capital per worker. 
Considering capital per person, then it should be divided by the total 
population, 1+݌, then capital per person is decreasing in the survival rate. This 
result helps to explain the evidence in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) that 
found little relationship between rising life expectancy and total GDP and a 
negative effect of rising life expectancy on GDP per capita due to population 
aging. Their paper provides empirical support of our theoretical result. By 
comparing the different impacts of the survival rate on capital accumulation 
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under two different models, we can conclude that the bequest motive of 
dynastic altruism is more empirically relevant. 
 
Proposition 11: Agents’ welfare function is a log-linear function of their total 
wealth and increases with bequests received from parents, given the 
logarithmic utility.  
 




ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ                                 (58) 














ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻሿ ൌ ݈݊
ଵିఈఋ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ        (65) 
According to equation (59), it follows that 
 ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ݈݊
ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
            ൌ ݈݊ ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ሺߙ݇ݐ൅1ߙെ1ሻ ൅ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
            ൌ ݈݊ ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ ݇ݐ൅1 ൅ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
            ൌ ݈݊ ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣




                                ௧ܹሻሿ 
 ൌ ݈݊ ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ߙ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൅ ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊
ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
  (66) 
Because ܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ and ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ are both linear function of ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ, we 
further assume ܸሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ, then ܸሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൌ
ܧ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ. 
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 According to equation (50), 
    ܸሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻ 
                  ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሾߜ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻሿ 
                  ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ݈݊ߜ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ܨ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
                ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ݈݊ߜ ൅  ܨ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൅ 
                    ܨሼ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ሾ ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻሿሽ 
                 ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ݈݊ߜ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ܨሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅
                                           ߙܨ  ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅  ௧ܹሻ             (67) 
Substitute equation (65), (66) and (67) into the Bellman equation, 
    ܸሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ max஺,ௌ,஻ሼܷሺܥଵ௧ሻ ൅ ߚ݌ܷሺܥଶ௧ାଵሻ ൅ ߜܸሺܤ௧ାଵ ൅ ௧ܹାଵሻሽ 
 R.H.S.ൌ ܧ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
L.H.S. ൌ ݈݊ ଵିఈఋ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൅ ߚ݌ሾ݈݊
ఉሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ߙ ൅ ߙ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
        ൅ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሿ ൅ ߜሾܧ ൅  ܨ݈݊ߜ ൅ ܨ ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ߙܨ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
        ൅ܨሺߙ െ 1ሻ݈݊ ఈሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሿ 
R.H.S.= L.H.S., then 
    ܨ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅  ߙߚ݌ ൅ ߙߜܨሻ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
    ܧ ൌ ݈݊ ଵିఈఋ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅  ߚ݌ሾ݈݊ ఉ
ሺଵିఈఋሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
൅ ݈݊ ߙ ൅ ሺߙ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ ఈ
ሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ଵାఈఉ௣
ሿ ൅  ߜሾܧ ൅




We can solve the results for E and F, 
    ܨכ ൌ ଵା ߙఉ௣
ଵିఈఋ
 






݈݊ ߙ ൅ ఉ௣
ଵିఋ
݈݊ ߚ ൅ ఋሺଵା ߙఉ௣ሻ
ሺଵିఋሻሺଵିఈఋሻ
݈݊ߜ െ
                 ଵା ߙఉ௣
ଵିఈఋ
݈݊ሺ1 ൅ ߙߚ݌ሻ െ
ሺଵିఈሻሺఋାఉ௣ሻ
ሺଵିఋሻሺଵିఈఋሻ
݈݊ሺߜ ൅ ߚ݌ሻ 
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Thus our guess is correct and the welfare function is 
 ܸሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ ൌ ܧכ ൅ ܨכ ݈݊ሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ 
Q.E.D. 
 
 Agents’ welfare function is a linear function of lnሺܤ௧ ൅ ௧ܹሻ , and 
increasing in bequests and income. According the previous proofs, the bequest 
motive of dynastic altruism is more empirically plausible than joy of giving. 
Therefore, in our view the utility from bequests should be derived from 
children’s welfare. That is, when parents give bequests, they consider the 
children’s welfare in a form VሺB୲ାଵ ൅ W୲ାଵሻ. This result once more proves 
that parents’ bequests are compensatory. When children have lower income, 
parents will relatively give higher bequests because parents want to keep their 
children’s welfare at certain level. The solution for the welfare function gives a 
theoretical reference for future assumption of the bequest function. 
4. Conclusion 
We have analyzed two models in comparison in this paper. The first one is an 
uncertain lifetime overlapping-generations model with the joy of giving 
bequests to children. In this model, the utility function of bequests is assumed 
and the size of bequests determines how much utility agents can get from 
giving bequests. We maximize agents’ two-period lifetime utilities including 
lifecycle consumption and the expected utility from accidental bequests and 
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planned bequests. We find that the accidental bequest equals the planned 
bequest with joy-of-giving. Agents purchase annuity to support their old-age 
consumption and hold non-annuity savings to give bequests. Annuity savings 
are increasing in the survival rate while non annuity savings are decreasing in 
the survival rate. The economy in the joy-of-giving model converges to a 
unique steady state of capital. The steady state capital is increasing in the 
survival rate, a result that may be inconsistent with evidence in the literature. 
Also inconsistent with evidence is the implication of the joy-of-giving for 
equal bequests among siblings. 
 The second model in our paper assumes dynastic altruism whereby agents 
derive utility from their own consumption as well as from future generations’ 
welfare. The welfare function is unknown and has to be solved. We find that 
accidental bequests and planned bequests are still equal to each other as in the 
joy-of-giving model. This result simplifies the analysis of the distribution and 
evolution of capital whereby family mortality history does not matter. The 
steady state level of aggregate capital or total output in the dynastic model is 
not affected by the survival rate, which is consistent with recent empirical 
evidence. In this sense, the dynastic altruism bequest motive is a more 
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